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T he 100th Congress has devoted considerable energy to improving the protection Medicare provides the elderly against financial catastrophe due to illness. Health and Human Services Secretary Otis Bowen sparked debate on the subject by proposing a $2,000 "cap" on the elderly's out-of-pocket spending on Medicare-covered services. Although that proposal purported to provide the elderly "catastrophic" protection, organizations of the elderly and several legislators challenged its adequacy. They believed that setting the out-of-pocket limit so high and ignoring services that Medicare failed to cover left too much genuine catastrophe untouched. Hence, legislators promoted lower caps, broader benefits, and special protection for the poor.
This article demonstrates both the validity of legislators' concerns about the financial burdens of the elderly and the strengths and weaknesses of remedies they put forward to reduce them. Much legislative discussion has focused on "catastrophe" as a problem of very large medical bills. Our focus is somewhat different. In our view, the burden medical expenses impose is a function of people's incomes. Enormous bills may mean catastrophe to anyone, but even small bills can be catastrophic to people with limited means. Some analysts perceive the latter as a problem of insufficient income rather than one of insufficient health insurance. Our premise, however, is that improving insurance is a far more efficient means of making medical care affordable than is raising people's incomes.
Deciding what share of income constitutes financial catastrophe is a question of values. Some might define catastrophe as expenses that threaten a person's existing standard of living; others, as expenses that threaten some "reasonable" standard of living. In either case, shares of income might vary with people's circumstances and with their incomes. An expense of 10 percent of income, for example, might jeopardize the living standard of a lower-income person, while a wealthy person might be able to withstand an expense of 20 percent or more. Expenses of 10 to 20 percent of income are typically defined as in the catastrophic range. Our analysis treats burdens of 15 and 20 percent of income as likely to represent catastrophe, recognizing that the ultimate definition is a matter for public policy to decide.
The following discussion describes the current incidence of catastrophic burdens among the elderly and assesses how various policy initiatives would affect those burdens. The analysis is based on data on individuals' income and expenses from the 1980 National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey (NMCUES). To approximate experience in 1986, the survey's 1980 data on incomes and expenses were inflated to reflect changes in those factors between 1980 and 1986.
Our findings are as follows. 1 In 1986, more than one-fifth of the elderly had medical bills exceeding 15 percent of income. Of these heavily MEDICARE CATASTROPHIC COSTS 7 burdened elderly, 90 percent had per capita incomes less than $10,000. For the vast majority, substantial burdens resulted from expenses less than $2,000, much of which went for services not covered by Medicare.
Relatively high limits on out-of-pocket spending for Medicare-covered services therefore do little to reduce the incidence of catastrophic expenses among lower-income elderly. Furthermore, as long as limits apply only to Medicare cost sharing, the addition of flat dollar caps, caps set as a percentage of income, or first-dollar protection for elderly in poverty still will leave a substantial proportion of elderly facing catastrophic expense.
To protect all elderly-near poor and middle income as well as the very poor -against extraordinary burdens, caps must cover a broad range of services and limit out-of-pocket expenses to the proportion of income that society defines as catastrophic. To avoid a policy change that some would deem politically catastrophic, Medicaid, not Medicare, could provide the vehicle for this reform.
Before we present our analysis, two caveats are in order. First, our analysis examines medical expenditures in relation to per capita rather than family income. Couples' incomes therefore have been divided in two. Using this approach allows a more detailed look at each individual's financial burdens as a function of his or her own insurance coverage and service use. However, the method potentially exaggerates the financial burdens elderly couples face. To assure our results were not distorted, we also analyzed data on couples and individuals separately. The results (not reported) remained fundamentally unchanged.
Second, our focus is on catastrophic expenses associated with the use of acute medical care services only. Our data did not allow an examination of the financial burdens generated by long-term care. Although the use of long-term care may absorb a greater share of an individual's resources, the data presented below indicate that a larger number of elderly can experience sizable financial burdens from acute care alone. By itself, then, the burden of acute care is worthy of investigation.
Catastrophic Burdens In The Current System
In 1986, elderly citizens spent an average of 11.2 percent of their per capita incomes on acute medical care. A look beyond the average, however, shows that over one-fifth of the elderly spent more than 15 percent of their incomes on medical care, over one-tenth spent more than 20 percent, and over 7 percent spent more than 25 percent.
Low-income elderly and elderly in poor health are especially likely to experience catastrophic financial burdens, despite Medicare's protection. Among the elderly with per capita incomes below $10,000 (over half of the elderly population), out-of-pocket expenses averaged 14 8 HEALTH AFFAIRS| Winter 1987 percent of income -almost twice the share paid by elderly with incomes above $10,000.
Average burdens do not reveal the full extent of differences between poor and better-off elderly. Exhibit 1 examines the incidence of catastrophic spending-defined as spending above 15 percent of income-in relation to the elderly's incomes and hospital use. Over one-third of the elderly with incomes below $10,000 experienced catastrophic burdens, compared to less than 6 percent of the better-off elderly. More than half of the low-income elderly who required a hospital stay experienced catastrophic expenses. Overall, 90 percent of elderly with catastrophic medical expenses had per capita incomes below $10,000.
Measured as a proportion of income, catastrophic burdens do not, for the most part, come from large dollar expenses. Two-thirds of elderly with expenses above 15 percent of income spent less than $1,500 on medical care. Only 15.6 percent spent more than $2,000. Medicare cost sharing and the Part B premium accounted for only about half of these expenses. The remainder came from physician charges above Medicare limits (13 percent); spending on services-predominantly prescription drugs-not covered by Medicare (31 percent); and administrative expenses and profits of private "Medigap" insurance (6 percent). 
Approaches To Catastrophic Protection
Legislative proposals to reduce the incidence of illness-induced financial catastrophe among the elderly have taken several forms. Following Secretary Bowen's lead, legislative initiatives proposed to cap out-ofpocket expenses at a specified dollar amount. Amounts have varied, from $1,000 to $2,000. Proposals also have varied in scope of benefits covered. In some proposals, the cap applied only to expenses on services currently covered by Medicare. Other proposals broadened the types of services both Medicare and the new cap would cover.
Recognizing that catastrophic means different things to those with low and high incomes, some proposals have targeted protection beyond the flat dollar cap to the poor elderly. The House bill (H.R. 2470) required Medicaid to "buy in" to Medicare all elderly with incomes below the poverty line. In other words, Medicaid would pay the Part B premium and all Medicare cost sharing on these individuals' behalf, essentially defining first-dollar spending as being catastrophic to the very poor. The following discussion examines the impact of these different approaches to catastrophic protection on the elderly's financial burdens. We also examine an alternative approach: setting out-of-pocket caps as a proportion of income rather than as a fixed dollar amount. Like the flat dollar cap, a proportionate cap would protect elderly only after their expenses exceeded a limit. But, unlike the flat dollar cap, that limit would be lower-in absolute dollars-for lower-than higher-income elderly. A proportionate cap could be limited to services traditionally covered by Medicare or expanded to incorporate additional benefits.
Unless specifically stated, the options examined below are not identical to actual bills. All of our calculations include Part B premiums in expenses subject to that limit. Most bills (including Bowen's proposal) exclude these premiums. Similar to most bills, our calculations exclude balance billing by physicians. To include balance billing essentially would represent an assumption that Medicare would agree to pay unlimited physician charges-a position neither likely nor desirable for Medicare to take.
Comparisons across policy options are based not on out-of-pocket expenses but on total private liabilities, that is, total medical care expenses less what is paid by Medicare or other public programs. There are several reasons for comparing proposals in terms of private liabilities. First, a Medicare cap is likely to operate in terms of liabilities rather than actual out-of-pocket expenditures. Under the Bowen plan, for example, the new Medicare benefit would apply once cost sharing exceeded the cap, regardless of who paid the first $2,000. Second, it is not clear what impact a catastrophic benefit will have on the purchase of supplementary insurance protection. A new benefit could lead many elderly to drop their Medigap coverage, substantially reducing out-of-pocket expenses. Alternatively, many elderly could buy new Medigap policies with modified benefits, paying the same or different premiums. The decisions people actually make will have a major impact on their out-of-pocket expenses. Since we cannot predict these decisions or the resulting distribution of out-of-pocket expenses, we exclude the impact of private insurance from our comparisons. Flat dollar caps on Medicare-covered services. elderly's liability under the current system to liabilities under three flat dollar caps on Medicare-covered services-set at $2,000, $1,000, and $500, respectively. 4 While the impact varies with the level at which the cap is set, all three caps leave substantial numbers of elderly exposed to sizable financial burdens.
The highest caps Congress considered would do almost nothing to reduce catastrophic burdens, defined relative to income. As shown in Exhibit 2, a $2,000 cap barely changes the proportion of elderly with burdens exceeding 15 or 20 percent of income. Furthermore, the cap's small impact is concentrated among elderly persons with incomes greater than $10,000. Many lower-income elderly people apparently lack the means to spend $2,000, which is, after all, in excess of 20 percent of their incomes. Although a $2,000 cap would be valuable to the relatively small proportion of elderly (3.5 percent) whose catastrophic burden results from very large Medicare-related expenses, a $2,000 cap would leave most of the elderly's health-related financial problems untouched.
Somewhat surprisingly, even lower flat dollar caps applied only to Medicare-covered services leave a larger proportion of elderly exposed to major out-of-pocket expenses. Although a $1,000 cap has more impact than a $2,000 cap, its impact is small and concentrated among the elderly with incomes above $10,000. Only by dropping the cap to $500 does a flat dollar cap on Medicare covered-services make a significant dent in the proportion of low-income elderly with liabilities above 15 percent of income. A $500 cap, which is lower than any cap Congress has consid- Unfortunately, this achievement would not come close to eliminating catastrophe among the lower-income elderly. Although elderly with incomes of less than $10,000 would benefit more from the $500 cap than from higher caps (although still less than the better-off), even a $500 cap on Medicare-covered services would leave about one-fifth of this population with liabilities greater than 15 percent of income.
Two facts explain why flat dollar caps on Medicare-covered services have such a limited impact on burdens among the low-income elderly: (1) a major share of these individuals' out-of-pocket expenses is for services that Medicare and the cap do not cover; and (2) even relatively small expenses by lower-income people represent a catastrophic proportion of income. Elderly who would satisfy a $500 cap on Medicarecovered services typically would spend about $1,000 in total-an amount that exceeds 15 percent of income for substantial numbers of low-income elderly not eligible for Medicaid.
Applying the cap to expanded benefits. A potential means to address this problem is to broaden the scope of services to which a flat dollar cap would apply. Congress has considered several benefit expansions, the most prominent of which is prescription drugs. Exhibit 3 presents examples of expanded caps: a $1,500 cap expanded to include prescription drugs, a $1,000 cap expanded to apply to the full array of noncovered acute-care services, and a similarly expanded $500 cap. Although these examples are not patterned on specific bills, they allow us to assess the impact of benefit expansion on caps' effects. Similar to lowering a cap, expanding the scope of benefits to which it applies enhances its impact. Expanding a $1,500 cap to include drugs makes its impact roughly equivalent to a $1,000 cap limited to traditionally Medicare-covered services. Applying a $1,000 cap to a full range of acute-care services now excluded from Medicare is roughly equivalent to a $500 cap limited to Medicare's currently covered care.
In other words, expanding the scope of a specific flat dollar cap can accomplish as much as but no more than lowering it by $500. As discussed above, then, a $1,500 cap applied to drugs (like a $1,000 cap limited to currently covered services) will make only a small dent in catastrophe. A $1,000 cap applied to all acute services (like a $500 cap on currently Medicare-covered services)-well beyond any cap Congress has considered-will have a significant impact but nevertheless will leave more than one-fifth of the lower-income elderly unprotected. To alleviate the problem of catastrophe among the lower-income elderly apparently requires both a low cap and an expansion of services. As Exhibit 3 shows, a $500 cap on all acute services brings the proportion of elderly with liabilities above 15 percent of income-urrently one in four elderly-below one in ten.
Targeting the poor. Recognizing that even a relatively low flat dollar cap fails to reach lower-income elderly, the House has attacked the problems of the poor directly. In 1986, Congress gave states two new options for expanding Medicaid coverage to all elderly below the poverty line, an estimated two-thirds of whom were receiving no Medicaid benefits. Under one option, states could choose to "buy in" to Medicare-that is, have Medicaid pay Part B premiums and all Medicare cost sharing-for all poor elderly. Under the other option, states could choose to go beyond these Medicare-related payments to provide full Medicaid benefits to the elderly poor.
The House catastrophic bill went a step further. Not only did it somewhat lower the cap on Medicare-covered services from the level Bowen proposed, it also required states to implement the buy-in to Medicare for all poor elderly. Furthermore, the bill expanded Medicare to cover prescription drugs, once an individual's expenses exceeded a $500 deductible. As part of the buy-in, Medicaid would pay this deductible for the poor or provide them Medicaid drug benefits. With firstdollar drug coverage included, the buy-in becomes almost equivalent to full Medicaid protection for poor elderly.
Exhibit 4 compares the impact of the various components of this bill: the cap alone; the cap with the buy-in, without drugs; and the cap with the buy-in, including drugs. Adding the buy-in to a lower cap does indeed have an impact on low-income elderly. With the buy-in, the proportion of elderly with incomes below $10,000 who spend more than 15 percent of income drops about 11.5 percent (from 26.1 to 23.1 percent). By contrast, without the buy-in, even the lower cap would reduce the proportion of low-income elderly with such sizable burdens by only 1.5 percent (from 26.1 to 25.4 percent of the population). Adding first-dollar drug coverage makes a far larger dent in the proportion of low-income elderly facing catastrophe-reducing the total below 20 percent, slightly. below the proportion. a $500 cap on Medicarecovered services would achieve. Furthermore, by providing the poor with first-dollar protection, this approach would overcome financial barriers to access for people who find any medical spending beyond their means.
Adding the buy-in to a specific flat dollar cap, then, substantially improves protection for the lower-income elderly. Expanding covered benefits improves their protection even more. Like other measures, however, these proposals have a significant limitation. Because they offer little to low-income elderly above the poverty level, they still leave close to one-fifth of low-income elderly facing burdens above 15 percent of income.
Impact of premium financing. For ideological and fiscal reasons, discussions of catastrophic protection have involved the concept of having the elderly pay a new benefit's costs. Payments by the elderly 14 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Winter 1987 could be through premiums or taxes, both of which have been proposed. Premiums typically treat most elderly alike, regardless of income. Taxes may vary with income. The following describes how premium financing that fails to take income into account may undermine the objectives of catastrophic protection.
The desirability of premium financing must be evaluated from two perspectives: (1) the equity of premium burdens in relation to benefits, and (2) the impact of new premiums on financial burdens, relative to income. The equity of premium financing depends heavily on the nature of catastrophic benefits. As described above, a flat dollar cap is likely to benefit disproportionately those elderly persons with higher incomes, who can more easily afford to spend up to the caps. The higher the dollar value of the cap and the more restricted the scope, the more disproportionate the benefit distribution will be (Exhibit 5).
Given this pattern of benefit distribution, premium financing represents a redistribution of income from lower-income to higher-income elderly. Exhibit 6 illustrates this redistribution for the Bowen plan-a $2,000 cap, limited to Medicare cost sharing (excluding the Part B premium), financed by equal premiums for all elderly regardless of income. (It is assumed, however, that Medicaid would pay premiums for its recipients, as it does now for Part B). Elderly with incomes above $10,000 derive over 70 percent of the benefits from the Bowen plan but pay only about 40 percent of the premium. In other words, premiums from low-income elderly and Medicaid are subsidizing the better-off. The greatest subsidy comes from the lower-income elderly with no supplementary insurance, who pay almost 13 percent of the new benefit's costs while receiving practically none of its benefits.
Changing financing or benefits can alleviate this inequity. Congressional initiatives modified Bowen's initial proposal in both ways. Relying
Exhibit 5 Proportion Of Elderly, By Income, Aided By Alternative Caps Elderly with incomes:
Caps on traditionally Medicarecovered services $2,000 $1,000 $500
Caps on expanded Medicare services $1,500 plus drugs $1,000 on all acute care $500 on all acute care primarily on income taxes rather than on premiums for financing, these proposals obtained greater contributions from the better-off than from the poor, essentially bringing payments and benefits into line. Furthermore, with the buy-in, benefits are redistributed so that the poor would get their proportionate share.
The second issue raised by premium financing is its impact on out-ofpocket burdens and the incidence of catastrophe. Premiums raise out-ofpocket costs and, potentially, catastrophic burdens. The more protection the cap provides, the higher its costs-and therefore premiums-will be. For the most liberal cap-the $500 cap on all acute services-full premium financing would conflict with the plan's objectives. If a premium for this benefit were added to the existing Part B premium, all elderly would face liabilities well above the $500 cap. Hence, this financing mechanism is incompatible with the proposed protection.
Although less generous caps are not totally incompatible with premium financing, nevertheless they may undermine significantly the protection caps aim to provide. A cap of $1,000 on all acute services would cost in excess of $500 in annual premiums, If all elderly had to pay these premiums, the proportion of low-income elderly with expenses above 15 percent of income would actually be higher with the new benefit than it is under the current system-increasing from 26.1 to 27.5 percent of elderly with incomes below $10,000 (Exhibit 7). Looked at another way, an annual premium of $500 would represent about 10 percent of income for an elderly person at the poverty level and 5 percent for even a median-income elderly person. Whether such a large burden is appropriate for all elderly to achieve a relatively small reduction in the Source: Authors' simulations using NMCUES.
incidence of catastrophe seems highly questionable. Premiums for caps that cost less have a smaller impact on out-ofpocket burdens. A $1,000 cap on Medicare-covered services would require annual premiums of about $180. Although a noticeable burden (3.6 percent of income) for poverty-level elderly, premiums at this level would hardly affect the proportion of elderly people spending more than 15 percent of income out of pocket. The same is true for the $60 premium associated with the Bowen plan. Premium financing therefore does not reduce the benefits of these proposals, although the proposals do little to reduce the incidence of sizable burdens in the first place.
Our analysis suggests that meaningful catastrophic protection cannot be financed through equal premiums on all elderly. Although it may be appropriate to derive some financing through premiums on the betteroff, taxation that takes income into account is a more equitable and effective approach. However, to avoid pitfalls of inequity and excessive burden, tax rates must be carefully designed to coincide with the distribution of benefits, cannot be so high as to force middle-or even upperincome elderly into catastrophe, and should not impose the full burden of caring for poor elderly on elderly who are better off. Society as a whole, not the elderly alone, should share that burden.
A New Approach
Measured as a proportion of income, catastrophic expenses are primarily a problem of lower-income elderly. Because their catastrophe results from relatively small expenses, high flat dollar caps (above $1,000) will not substantially reduce the number of elderly who face it. Because their catastrophic expenses come from services Medicare excludes as well as those it covers, even a low flat dollar cap ($500) will leave one-fifth of the low-income elderly with substantial burdens. Combining a $1,000 cap with first-dollar Medicare coverage for the poor (the socalled buy-in) somewhat reduces burdens among the lower-income elderly. But it, too, leaves one-fifth facing catastrophe, primarily because it leaves out elderly too "rich" for the buy-in and too poor to derive protection from the cap.
Among options discussed so far, only a low ($500) cap that would apply to a broader array of benefits than Medicare now covers and that would be financed through taxes, not premiums, would bring the proportion of low-income elderly facing catastrophe below 10 percent. A major portion of the benefits under such a cap, however, would go to elderly with incomes above $10,000. Currently, fewer than 10 percent of these elderly face expenses exceeding 15 percent of income.
Relating caps to income. Setting caps as a proportion of income, rather than at a flat dollar amount, offers a potential means to alleviate catastrophic burdens among the lower-income elderly at lower cost. In contrast to flat dollar caps, proportionate caps make it possible to enhance protection of the low income elderly without increasing protection of the far less burdened better-off. For a lower total program expense, then, it is possible to provide better protection to the group who needs it most.
However, even a proportionate cap set as low as 10 percent of income would leave a substantial proportion of low-income elderly facing catastrophe if it were limited to services Medicare has traditionally covered (Exhibit 8). To reduce the incidence of catastrophe dramatically, even a proportionate cap would have to apply to a broader range of services than Medicare now covers.
A cap on all acute-care expenses set at 10 percent of income would bring average burdens below 10 percent of income for low-and highincome elderly, and would leave fewer than 7 percent of the low-income elderly with catastrophic burdens in excess of 15 percent of their incomes (less than 3 percent with burdens exceeding 20 percent of income) (Exhibit 8). This cap would accomplish more and cost less than a flat dollar cap on all acute services set at $500.
Absorbing such a proportionate cap into Medicare would be highly controversial. A proportionate cap would alter Medicare in a way that has always been anathema to its supporters: shifting from equal benefits for all elderly, regardless of income, to benefits that vary with people's means. Although means testing for a catastrophic benefit is not the same as Medicaid's and other welfare programs' means testing for basic eligi- bility, some fear that it would give the entire program a welfare cast that ultimately would weaken the program's political base, leaving all elderly worse off. Adding catastrophic coverage to Medicaid. Income-related catastrophic protection, however, need not be introduced through Medicare. Instead, it could be added to Medicaid. Medicaid could be modified to cover a full range of services for elderly whose medical spending exceeds 10 percent of income. Such a reform would represent a transformation of Medicaid's current coverage for the "medically needy." Under the current program, most states have "medically needy" programs in which people are eligible for Medicaid when their medical expenses reduce their disposable income to (or near to) the cash assistance level in the state. These "medically needy" programs assure access to medical care for people whose expenses exceed their ability to pay. However, they finance care only after financial catastrophe and do not prevent its occurrence. The alternative we propose would protect people whose expenses exceed a specified proportion of income rather than people who "spent down" to a predetermined (and very low) dollar amount.
Using Medicaid rather than Medicare to provide this catastrophic protection has several advantages. First, reliance on Medicaid would allow limiting eligibility for the catastrophic benefit to the lower-income population most in need. Costs would be lower if the benefit were made available only to the population with incomes below $10,000, and would be lower still if eligibility standards took assets as well as income into account. Second, Medicaid already deals with acute-care benefits beyond the services Medicare covers, which are essential to making the benefit effective. Hence the new benefit could be incorporated into an existing 
